This contribution examines the norm development process of digital sovereignty in China, the EU, the US and Russia, taking digital sovereignty as an umbrella-term for concepts such as cyber sovereignty, technological sovereignty, data sovereignty, souveraineté numérique, digitale Souveränität, wangluo zhuquan (‘network sovereignty’), xinxi zhuquan (‘information sovereignty’) and sovereign internet. Although not identical, all of these concepts focus on the “territorialisation” of digital data, services and infrastructure, implemented through policies and regulation. Extending Finnemore and Sikkink’s three-stage model, four phases of the norm development of digital sovereignty are identified. The first phase, norm emergence, lasts from the late 1990s to Russia’s laws on internet control in 2012. During this phase, the US is the largely uncontested digital hegemon and China is the prime norm entrepreneur of digital sovereignty, promoting "network sovereignty" and "information sovereignty". The second phase, norm cascade, is initiated by the Snowden revelations in 2013 and characterised by an increasingly multipolar order. During this phase, the EU adopted a notion of digital sovereignty with a focus on economic aspects and privacy. And Russia’s notion of "sovereign internet" became increasingly radicalised regarding data localization, infrastructural "sovereignisation" and censorship. From 2016 to 2020, the US and the EU underwent a third phase, norm universalisation. Triggered by Russia’s interference with the US general election and Brexit in 2016, these countries and regions, too, issued or promoted regulation and policies regarding disinformation and pursued infrastructural "sovereignisation". The COVID-crisis 2020/21 initiated the fourth stage of the norm development cycle, norm internalisation. Procedures of digital sovereignty are increasingly implemented with civil society playing an important role.
Mots clés : Digital Sovereignty|China|Russia|norm development process|EU
A103943JT