Amparo MOYANO, Universidad de Castilla La Mancha (UCLM), Spain
Frédéric DOBRUSZKES, Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB), Belgium
Since 2001, different regulations of the railway system, the so-called “railway packages”, were adopted with the final aim of gradually opening up rail transport service markets for competition. Although this procedure began more than 10 years ago, the passengers’ market liberalisation was fixed by 2020 as deadline and, therefore, is now ongoing. Nevertheless, anticipating the European regulatory framework, the competition started in Italy in 2012 when a new high-speed rail (HSR) private operator entered the HSR market to compete with the existing public operator. Now, in a similar procedure, it is time to other main HSR European markets such as Spain or France, where the game of liberalisation is starting.
In this research, we propose an assessment of the Spanish case regarding the end of national rail monopolies, combining ex-post and ex-ante observations of liberalisation effects in different cases studies. We focus on train operating companies’ financial balance in a scenario of increasing competition after the liberalisation of the most profitable HSR routes and, specifically, on cross-subsidising issues to the detriment of non-profitable routes and the role of Public Service Obligations in this new scenario. This analysis will give some insights regarding the socioeconomic effects related to liberalisation processes.
Mots clés : rail liberalisation|cross-subsiding|high-speed rail
A102354AM